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Abstract: The use of probabilistic risk analysis in jet engines manufacturing process is essential to prevent failure. The objective of this 
study is to present a probabilistic risk analysis model to analyze the safety of this process. The standard risk assessment normally conducted 
is inadequate to address the risks. To remedy this problem, the model presented in this paper considers the effects of human, software 
and calibration reliability in the process. Bayesian Belief Network coupled to a Bow Tie diagram is used to identify potential engine failure 
scenarios. In this context and to meet this objective, an in depth literature research was conducted to identify the most appropriate modeling 
techniques and an interview were conducted with experts. As a result of this study, this paper presents a model that combines fault tree 
analysis, event tree analysis and a Bayesian Belief Networks into a single model that can be used by decision makers to identify critical risk 
factors in order to allocate resources to improve the safety of the system. The model is delivered in the form of a computer assisted decision 
tool supported by subject expert estimates.
Key words: Probabilistic Risk Analysis, Situation Model, Bayesian Belief Net-work. 
1. Introduction
Organizations may fail when they make no 
investment in a probabilistic risk analysis. This 
paper aims to present a model for probabilistic 
risk analysis to be used in the manufacturing of jet 
engines. The traditional method of assessing the 
system correctness relies on testing and simulation 
techniques. The proposed model uses an approach 
that employs a representation of scenarios based on 
the analysis of operational situations. The concept of 
proposed operational status is deal with the structural 
and behavioral complexity of systems (Beugin et al., 
2007). In the jet engine manufacturing resources are 
limited; the ultimate decision is one of cost against 
benefits. An educated guess, based on carefully 
designed and constructed models, is much better 
than blindly judgments alone (Ale et al., 2009).
The knowledge of experts in the process of jet 
engines manufacturing can be used to estimate 
the probability of engine failure. The information 
obtained from these experts should be combined 
in a formal way. Clemen and Winkler (1999), 
Droguett, Groen and Mosleh (2004) claim that 
formal procedures are increasingly applied to elicit 
the opinion of specialists. If the data are obtained 
systematically from well-informed experts in primary 
and secondary processes, the opinion of experts can 
offer acceptable precision in quantification.
Considering the context presented above, this paper 
aims to present a proposal for probabilistic risk 
analysis based on Bow Tie methodology for building 
a combined model with Bayesian Belief Network, 
which can be used to analyze critical activities that 
can affect the reliability of the safety system in the 
manufacturing of jet engines. 
The research was focused on two main points. The 
first was the review of the modelling techniques and 
causal structure normally utilized in probabilistic 
risk modelling. The techniques Fault Tree, Event 
Tree, Bow Tie chart and Bayesian Belief Network 
were considered appropriate for this study; the 
second point was the application of the model on the 
jet engines manufacturing process.
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The structure of the paper is divided in 5 items. The 
first item presents the introduction highlighting the 
importance of probabilistic risk analysis in the jet 
engines manufacturing process. The second presents 
a brief description of techniques fault tree, event tree, 
and Bayesian Belief Network. The third presents 
the application of probabilistic risk analysis in the 
manufacturing of jet engines. The fourth describes 
the results and discussion of the study and the fifth 
presents the conclusion of the research. 
This paper presents an update to the preliminary 
proposal of systemic application of bayesian belief 
network coupled to a Bow Tie diagram to identify 
potential engine failure scenarios (Pereira and Lima, 
2014). Risks dversely affect the performance of 
offshore industry. The understanding of the mutual 
interaction among various risks, which affect the 
performance of the offshore outsourcing, is crucial 
(Kumara et al., 2014). The same approach applies to 
jet engines manufacturing industry.
2. Modelling Techniques and Causal 
Structure in Risk Modelling
Despite the impressive level of safety in aviation, it 
is generally acknowledged that the accident rate has 
to be decreased still further. The main reason is the 
projected growth in air traffic movements (Ale et al., 
2006). The management of risks integrated with the 
operations of the manufacturing reduces accidents 
(Petersen, 2000) and improves productivity and 
the economic and financial performance of the 
company (Nureg, 2001). Accidents result from 
a combination of factors, such as design errors, 
mechanical failures, software errors, user errors, 
and organizational or regulatory factors (Marais 
and Robichaud, 2012). Based on causal scenarios 
derived from hazardous events, use of safety goals 
and risk un-certainty calculations is essential 
(Kumamoto, 1996). Assigning risk budgets to 
manufacturing process requires an understanding of 
how the risks of individual elements in the system 
influence the overall level of safety. This implies 
knowledge of causal sequences of engine failure in 
operation situation. This approach reduces accidents 
(Petersen, 2000) and improves productivity and the 
economic and financial performance of the company 
(Rechenthin, 2004). The proposed model can be 
an important decision support tool for decision-
making. Quantitative risk analysis is an ideal method 
to map one’s risks, but it has limitations due to the 
complexity of model and scarcity of data (Marais 
and Robichaud, 2012). This limitation needs to be 
overcome by expert elicitation procedures. 
2.1. Fault Tree and Event Tree Modeling
H. A. Watson from Bell Telephone Laboratories first 
conceived fault-tree analysis in 1961. US Air Force 
also used Fault-Tree to study missiles launch control 
system. In 1965 Safety Symposium, sponsored by 
the University of Washington, Boeing Company 
presented Fault tree, several papers were presented 
about fault-tree analysis. These papers marked the 
beginning of a widespread interest in using Fault-
Tree Analysis as a system safety reliability tool for 
complex dynamic systems, such as nuclear reactors. 
The fundamental concept in fault-tree analysis is the 
conversion of a physical system into a structured 
logic probabilistic evaluation diagram (fault tree), in 
which certain specified causes lead to one specified 
top event of interest, as shown in Figure 1.
	   Top	  
Event	  
Figure 1. Logical Gates “AND” and “OR”.
Fault trees can adequately describe probabilistic 
relationships and even the role of human behavior 
in accident generation. It provides a rigorous way 
to link causes and effects in a technological system 
(Rausand, 2011). Data are required for basic events 
related to human failure, software failure and 
calibration failure. Missing data are obtained by 
expert opinion. 
An event tree represents the possible consequences 
of a hazard or event called initiator event. The 
construction of an event tree begins with the 
specification of an initiation event. Roelen (2008) 
states that an event tree represents possible 
consequences of dangerous situation or event named 
initiating event. According to Rausand (2011), 
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hazardous events should be identified and a 
number of barriers should be planned to mitigate 
the consequences of events. The fault tree may be 
combined with the event tree to form a Bow Tie 
diagram. Each path through the diagram is a scenario. 
The proposed model employs the combined fault 
tree and event tree and allows the representation of 
several scenarios.
An event tree represents the possible consequences 
of a hazard or event called initiator event. The 
construction of an event tree begins with the 
specification of an initiation event. Figure 2 
represents this condition, success leads to a specific 
consequence and failure leads to the next reactive 
layer.
	  
Figure 2. Event Tree.
In order to quantify the event tree, the probabilities 
of occurrence of the initial event and the success 
or failure of the reactive layers are considered. 
Considering that the fault trees are used to obtain 
the probability of a system failure, the fault tree may 
be combined with the event tree to form a Bow Tie 
diagram. The pivot event is the final failure event 
obtained with the fault tree and the initial event for the 
event tree. The pivot event may occur or not, which 
leads to different final situations. Each path through 
the diagram is a scenario. The model combines fault 
tree, event tree and allows the representation of 
several scenarios.
2.2. Bayesian Belief Networks Modelling
Bayesian Networks (BNs, also called Bayesian 
Belief Networks (BBNs) provides a causal structure 
that allows probability risk analysis practitioners 
to gain deeper insight into risk drivers and into 
specific interventions that reduce risk (Mosleh, 
1992; Rechenthin, 2004). There has been an increase 
trend in the application of Bayesian networks in 
fields related to reliability, safety and maintenance 
(Mahadevan et al., 2001). Bayesian approaches 
to aggregate expert judgments on probabilities 
have been extensively investigated in risk and 
reliability analysis (Mosleh, 1986; Droguett et al., 
2004; Podofillini and Dang, 2013). BNs provide a 
framework for addressing many of the shortcomings 
of human reliability analysis from a researcher 
perspective and from a practitioner perspective 
(Boring et al., 2010; Groth, Swiler, 2013). External 
human performance factors depend on company, 
society and technology (Calixto, 2013).
The Bayesian Network methodology was developed 
to make predictions easier. It can be defined as 
graphic frameworks, which represents arguments 
in uncertain domain. Such frameworks are unicycle 
Graphs, since they cannot make up closed cycles and 
have only one direction. The node represents random 
variables and arcs represent direct dependency 
between variables. The arcs direction represents 
cause effect relation between variables. Figure 3 
represents the Bayesian Network, being node H 
consequence from causes T and P. In Figure 3, nodes 
T and P are fathers of H and are called ancestral of H. 
	  
Figure 3. Bayesian Network.
In Human Reliability analysis, for example, the 
Nodes T and P represents performance human factors 
and node H represents human error probability 
conditioned to human performance factors T and P. 
In each node there is a conditional probability table, 
which represent variables. General equation (1) 
represents the probability of occurrence of variable 
H conditioned to the occurrence of variables T and P.
P(H)= ,p H T I P j p T i p P j1
ji 0
1
0
1
# # # #= = = = =
==
^ ^ ^h h h//  (1)
Equation (2) estimates the probability of variable 
H becoming true, conditioned to variables P and T 
being true or false.
P(H=true)= p(H=true/T=true, P=true)×p(T=true) ×p(P=true)
 p(H=true/T=true, P=false)×p(T=true) ×p(P=false)
 p(H=true/T=false, P=true)×p(T=false) ×p(P=true)
 p(H=true/T=false, P=false)×p(T=false) ×p(P=false)
(2)
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2.3. Bow Tie Modelling
Bow Tie models are tools for integrating broad 
classes of cause-consequence models. The familiar 
fault tree and event tree models are ‘Bow Tied’ in this 
way; indeed, attaching the fault tree’s top event with 
the event tree’s initiating event originally suggested 
the Bow Tie terminology. . 
A bow-tie chart is used to show the combination of 
a fault tree on the left and an event tree on the right. 
Figure 4 shows the fault tree connected via the top 
event to the event tree.
	  
Figure 4. Bow tie chart.
3. Risk Management in the 
Manufacturing of jet engines
The objective of this paper is to develop a 
probabilistic risk analysis model to analyse the safety 
of the jet engine manufacturing process. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is being addressed in 
this paper: Causal modelling using Bayesian 
network with quantitative and expert elicitation 
process is feasible and has a positive effect on the 
determination of engine failure in manufacturing 
situational operation. Risk management examines 
the different phases of the jet engine manufacturing 
process to assess, evaluate and control safety 
conditions. It uses techniques to prevent failures or 
reduce their consequences to an acceptable level 
and works to identify critical risks that may affect 
safety. The risk management process evaluates the 
diverse system activities (Beugin et al., 2007). For 
technical systems, risk is related to the probability 
of failure of components or of an entire system 
causing exposure to hazard and related consequences 
(Esteves et al., 2005). Probabilistic risk analysis 
provides the framework for evaluating safety in the 
manufacturing of jet engines in operating situation. 
Performance management has become a key success 
factor for any organization (Gurrea et al., 2014). Risk 
and performance management should be combined 
with financial management using quantitative and 
probabilistic risk analysis.
The values of probabilities to feed the  model may be 
obtained by historical data. However the necessary 
parameters for modelling are not always known with 
certainty. 
Experts may have valuable knowledge about models 
and parameters for problems in their specific field of 
interest (Goossens et al., 2008). It is very important 
to develop practical models with a transparent 
mathematical foundation for the use of expert 
opinion (Cooke, 1991; Clement et al., 2005; Brooker, 
2011). In the proposed model, the quantification and 
aggregation of expert’s opinion on human, software 
and calibration failure provide important input to 
a decision maker. Approaches that can capture the 
tacit knowledge of operators and technicians and 
transform this to the mathematical format required in 
the predictive models are needed (Rosqvist, 2000). 
If all of the experts agree on a probability, then the 
combined probability must also agree (Clemen and 
Winkle, 1999). The flow chart of Figure 5 represents 
an overview of the jet engine manufacturing process. 
The Jet engine manufacturing process represented 
in Figure 5 starts with the turbine rotor assembly 
in Process 1. The next process in the sequence is 
the compressor rotor assembly in Process 2. The 
turbine and compressor rotors are then attached to 
one another in Process 3. These three processes are 
very critical, since the engine components are all 
assembled with interference, and needs to be heated 
or cooled properly under controlled conditions. The 
turbine/compressor rotor are machined together in 
Process 4 in order to set up the tip of the blades in 
the required assembly dimensions. Once the rotor is 
finished, another sub-assembly processes is started, 
which is the engine core assembly in Process 5. 
The engine is then finally built up by attaching all 
the previous assembled submodules together in 
Process 6.
The pivot event in the jet engine manufacturing 
process is the occurrence of failure or non-failure in 
Process 6. This pivot event represents the condition 
of the engine being manufactured with or without 
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a defect. In process 7 the engine is submitted to 
operation l test in a test cell that simulates on wing 
operation, at this point the engine is run in different 
conditions including take off, which the most extreme 
one. In process 8 an internal boroscope inspection of 
the engine is conducted, where the internal hardware 
is inspected for damages that might have occurred 
during the test. This procedure is normally recorded 
in a video for traceability purposes. In process 9 the 
engine is reinspected with boroscope at the customer 
to ensure damages have not occurred during engine 
transportation. In process 10 the engine is tested on 
wing by the airframer and in process 11 the engine 
is also tested on wing in the airline before being put 
in operation.
Figure 6 represents the methodology used to build 
the model. The first step is to conduct a field research 
with experts in the process. The second step is to 
build a high-level jet engine assembly process map 
(Figure 5). The third is to define the pivotal event 
that represents a split where the assembled engine 
could be manufactured right or wrong. 
The fourth step is to employ the fault tree, then 
the event tree (Step fifth) and BBN (Step sixth) to 
graphically represent the model. 
Once the BBN is complete, in the seventh step 
specialists elicit the probabilities of failure in the 
different manufacturing processes using structured 
protocols. 
In the eight step, the conditional probability tables 
of a specific software are completed with the 
conditional probabilities. 
The last step (Step ninth) is to run the free 
downloadable commercial BBN software named 
Agena Risk to obtain the final probability of engine 
failure. 
	  
Figure 5. Jet Engine Manufacturing Process.
	  
Figure 6. Basic model building process.
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Probability risk analysis mostly deals with 
evaluation of components, systems and equipment 
failure probabilities, human error probabilities and 
quantification of accident scenarios, which includes 
modelling of physical processes (Moieni, 1994; 
Clément et al., 2005). The model is a computer 
assisted decision tool that combines all the previously 
mentioned probabilities. 
The main advantage of the model is that it provides 
decision makers with the final probability of engine 
failure. The drawback is the time it takes to elicit 
probabilities from experts.
4. Results and Discussion
This paper presents a model that combines fault tree 
analysis, event tree analysis and a Bayesian Belief 
Networks that can be used by decision makers to 
identify critical risk factors in order to allocate 
resources to improve the safety of the system. The 
Bayesian belief nets, fault-trees and event trees are 
combined in an integrated model. 
The flowchart of Figure 7 portrays progression of 
events over time, while BBN, fault-trees and event 
trees represent the logic corresponding to failure of 
complex systems. It shows the integrated structure 
of the model. 
The connection between the integrated structure of 
Figure 7 and the flowchart of Figure 5 are detailed in 
the next paragraph. In the model, a bow-tie chart is 
used to show the combination of a fault tree on the 
left and an event tree on the right. Figure 7 shows 
the framework of the fault tree connected via the top 
event ET, which is an incorrect engine assembly, to 
the base of an event tree. 
The latter is branching out from the initiating 
critical event to potential consequences of engine 
failure in operation named FO. Figure 7 represents 
the preventive barriers CP1, CP2 and CP3 for 
the processes 1, 2 and 3 shown in Figure 1. If the 
process 1 (IE1 - Turbine Assembly) is performed 
incorrectly, the preventive layer (CP1 – Turbine 
Balancing) will detect the mistake, which must be 
corrected before proceeding with the assembly 
process. The same process will be followed with the 
preventive layers CP2 and CP3. The reactive layers 
CR1, CR2 and CR3 for the processes 7, 8 and 9 
also shown in Figure 5. If the engine is assembled 
incorrectly (ET), the first reactive layer (CR1) 
will detect the error and the engine will need to be 
reworked before proceeding with the manufacturing 
process. The same process will be followed with the 
reactive layers CR2 and CR3.
The connecting lines from a fault tree basic fault 
to any event tree branch end consequence form a 
scenario; so one Bow Tie can show many scenarios 
(Pereira et al., 2014). Figure 7 shows the factors F1, 
	  
Figure 7. Integrated Model.
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F2 and F3 that cause human failure, software failure 
and calibration failure. 
These factors are aggregated by BBN to estimate the 
probability of occurrence of basic events EB1, EB2 
and EB3, as shown in Figure 7 These basic events 
represent the probability of human failure, software 
failure and calibration failure respectively. Figure 7 
also shows the basic events leading to failure 
of Intermediate events EI1, EI2 and EI3, which 
represents the different manufacturing processes, 
such as the processes 1, 2 and 3 shown in Figure 5. 
According to the diagram, If ET does not occur; 
the engine will operate normally (ON). In case ET 
occurs, the reactive layers CR1, CR2 and CR3 will 
be in the path and the result will be some kind of 
rework (RT). If none of the final reactive layers 
functions, the result will be operational failure (FO). 
The final probability of engine failure is given by 
combining all the probabilities. 
The probabilities of occurrence of factors F1, F2 
and F3 elicited from experts are aggregated with 
specific BBN software, which will take into account 
the interdependency among these factors. The fault 
trees and event trees are converted into BBN’s and 
then they are aggregated into a larger BBN. In order 
to validate the model with a practical demonstration, 
Figure 8 shows an example of a larger BBN 
aggregating some basic events, intermediate events, 
preventive layers and reactive layers. Each node 
has a conditional probability table associated to it. 
The software Agena Risk adds up the conditional 
probability values and estimates a final probability 
for the engine failure.
Figure 8 shows an example of practical application 
of the general Bayesian network to some limited 
part of the jet engines manufacturing. This network 
was obtained with the combination of specific 
Bayesian networks generated from the fault tree 
and event trees. The network represents the node 
“failure in compressor assembly”, the node “failure 
in compressor balancing” and the node “failure in 
engine testing”. The Bayesian network software 
named Agena Risk is used to run the model, the 
probability values obtained for the nodes are 
also shown in the Figure 8. The aggregation of 
all probabilities results in a probability of engine 
failure of 0.0079. This value was obtained assigning 
the probability of failure of 0.01 to all primary 
independent variables. The value 0.01 is  just a 
random value for demonstration purposes. The real 
values will be elicited from experts.
A failure in testing contributes with a probability of 
0.1983. If engine testing is incorrectly conducted 
	  
Figure 8. Example of  Bayesian Network.
39Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2015) 3(1), 33-42Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Probabilistic risk analysis in manufacturing situational operation: application of modelling techniques and 
causal structure to improve safety performance
and fails to detect oil and fuel leaks, vibration and 
poor performance, the engine will fail in operation 
in the aircraft with serious consequences. A failure 
in compressor balancing has a probability of 0.0393. 
In the test failure, the human failure contributes with 
0.0772, software failure with 0.0772 and calibration 
failure with 0.0582. The failure of assembling and 
balancing the compressor contributes with 0.1983. In 
the compressor assembly failure, the human failure 
contributes with 0.0772, the software failure with 
0.0772 and calibration failure with 0.0585. The same 
happens to the failure of balancing. 
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a model that combines Fault 
Tree analysis, Event Tree analysis and Bayesian 
Belief Networks in an integrated model that can 
be used by decision makers to identify critical risk 
factors in order to allocate resources to improve the 
safety of the system. The result of this study adds 
to the body of evidence that the methodology for 
probabilistic risk analysis and causal model in jet 
engine manufacturing industry is feasible and the 
model is a powerful tool to be used by decision 
makers in the jet engine manufacturing industry. 
The application of the model for probabilistic risk 
assessment to the manufacturing of jet engines has 
been presented.
It combines Bayesian belief network fault tree, event 
tree and Bow Tie in a situational operation. The 
single homogeneous structure of the model allows 
consistent handling of probabilities of the factors 
affecting engine failure and their interdependence.
The proposed hypothesis, which is the feasibility 
of constructing a causal modelling using Bayesian 
network with quantitative and expert elicitation 
process for determination of engine failure in 
manufacturing situational operation, is therefore 
validated and it may have a positive effect on the jet 
engines manufacturing safety.
The application of the model to jet engines 
manufacturing process in a real situation needs to be 
done in order to identify improvement opportunties. 
Independent data obtained from experts elicitation 
process need to be used to complete the conditional 
probability tables in the software Agena Risk and 
verify the probability of engine failure. 
Result of calculations need to be discussed with the 
experts to identify discrepancies to be corrected. The 
causal model can be used as a tool to safety decisions 
in the industries of jet engines manufacturing.
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